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INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, activists and advocates have
rightly focused their attention on the immediate need to decrease the number
of people in jails and prisons. 1 Jails and prisons have been ravaged by the

* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. I would like to thank participants in
the NIU Criminal Law Works-in-Progress workshop, Geoffrey Bickford, Russell Covey,
Lucian Dervan, Sarah Dobson, Margaret Maffai, Kristina McKenna, Dale Rappaneau, Cheryl
Saniuk-Heinig, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner.
1
Emily Widra & Peter Wagner, Jails and Prisons Have Reduced Their Populations in
the Face of the Pandemic, but not Enough to Save Lives, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 5,
2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/08/05/jails-vs-prisons-update-2/ [https://per
ma.cc/7TBK-2X8D].
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virus and defendants are at real risk of illness or death in those spaces. 2 But
as the crisis continues and the backlog of criminal cases grows, defendants
face additional risks. This essay focuses on one such risk: the heightened
risk for coerced and false pleas during the crisis.
The vehicle by which the criminal system resolves most criminal
cases—the plea bargain 3—is ripe for abuse and overuse in the best of times.
Unfortunately, now is far from the best of times, and as I outline here, there
are several reasons why the usual risk factors for coercive plea bargaining
are exacerbated during this public health crisis. Furthermore, despite recent
efforts to reform the plea system, the pandemic risks entrenching many of the
most negative characteristics of plea bargaining even more deeply.
Quite simply, the coercive nature of plea bargaining will get worse in a
system that is backlogged and unable to hold jury trials for several months.
Many states are not counting the delays caused by the coronavirus toward a
defendant’s speedy trial clock, which means the cases can remain active for
long periods of time and without any risk to the prosecutor that the case will
be dismissed for lack of prosecution. 4 For a defendant in this backlogged
system, with a case hanging over her head and a speedy trial clock without
finality, the plea will be her only option. In such an environment, coercive
pleas can and will flourish.
This essay proceeds in three parts. Part I of the essay discusses the
particular concerns related to coercive plea bargaining during the COVID-19
crisis. Part II offers solutions to these issues and suggests that this moment
may provide opportunities for creative problem-solving capable of outlasting
the virus. Finally, Part III discusses some silver linings of the crisis for the
criminal system at large and the practice of plea bargaining in particular.
Like many other recent pieces about the impact of coronavirus on the
criminal justice system, 5 this essay addresses the current crisis in the hopes
2
Katie Park & Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons,
MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-lookat-coronavirus-in-prisons#staff-cases [https://perma.cc/P6GG-L7VG].
3
Ninety to ninety-five percent of guilty pleas are resolved through guilty plea. Lindsey
Devers, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH SUMMARY: PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 1 (2011),
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SXJ-6QXW].
4
See infra Part I.2.
5
See, e.g., Matthew Bender, Unmuted: Solutions to Safeguard Constitutional Rights in
the Virtual Courtroom and How Technology Can Expand Access to Counsel and
Transparency in the Criminal Justice System, 66 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3672441; Susan Bandes & Neal
Feigenson, Virtual Trials: Necessity, Invention, and the Evolution of the Courtroom, 68
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that it will teach us important lessons about the system more broadly. By
seeing some of the worst parts of the system exposed through COVID-19,
we may be able to better meet future challenges and tackle some of the
underlying daily injustices of the modern criminal process.
I.

THE RISK FACTORS FOR COERCIVE PLEAS DURING AND AFTER
COVID-19

There are three broad categories of concern for the misuse and abuse of
plea bargaining during this crisis: 1) the even greater coercive force of a
prison or jail sentence during a pandemic, 2) the difficulty with holding—or
complete lack of—jury trials, and 3) issues with access to counsel. These
areas overlap in many ways, but defining these categories allows one to
explore the challenges that defendants will face during and after this crisis.
A. THE EVEN GREATER COERCIVE POWER OF A PRISON OR JAIL
SENTENCE DURING A PANDEMIC

1. Pretrial Detention and Incarceratory Sentence as Potential Death
Sentence
A regular feature of the criminal system is the pretrial detention of
defendants who cannot afford bail. For many decades, this practice has been
criticized for coercing defendants into accepting pleas. 6 People are, of
course, inclined to avoid sitting in a jail cell under any circumstances, even
where they may be innocent and could launch a defense. Recent studies
indicate that pretrial detention increases the risks of a false plea
substantially. 7
BUFFALO L. REV. 5 (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3683408; Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Unmasking Demeanor, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO
158 (2020); Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, 115 NW. U.L. REV.
ONLINE 59 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?a
rticle=1291&context=nulr_online&preview_mode=1&z=1596157754; Benjamin Levin,
Criminal Law in Crisis, U. COLO. L. REV. (2020), https://lawreview.colorado.edu/?p=627;
Jenia I. Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699045; Melanie D. Wilson, The Pandemic
Juror, U. TENN. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 401 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678923.
6
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 20–31 (2010), https://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39EL-2HTZ].
7
See Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting
the Lasting Implications of Collateral Consequences against Pretrial Detention in Decisions
to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 204, 213–14 (2018) (reviewing the results of
the authors’ study finding that pretrial detention increases the likelihood that even innocent
people will plead guilty).
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During the pandemic, the risk of false or coerced pleas is amplified. The
COVID-19 crisis makes jails and prisons—already unsafe spaces—
particularly treacherous because they are hotspots for viral spread. 8 As Jenny
Carroll notes, COVID-19 has highlighted the many failings of the pretrial
detention system. 9 She writes, “[i]n the midst of a public health crisis,
pretrial detention determinations raise more than the possibility of
confinement, indignity, and [] downstream consequences []; these decisions
raise the possibility that a person will be exposed to a known fatal contagion
as a result of an accusation.” 10 A prison or jail sentence poses similar risks,
and there have already been thousands of cases of COVID-19 in jails and
prisons across the nation and 1,276 deaths, including of several young,
otherwise healthy individuals. 11 The number of cases and deaths in the
nation’s jails and prisons rise daily. 12 In addition to these risks, many states
are struggling with a lack of alternatives to pretrial detention. For example,
as The Appeal reported, a shortage of ankle monitors has resulted in many
people staying in jail, even when a court has ordered home detention. 13
And prosecutors know all of this. There have been disturbing anecdotal
reports of state prosecutors threatening defendants by holding out a plea
bargain as the defendant’s only way to avoid incarceration and potential
exposure to coronavirus. 14 As the crisis continues and the coronavirus
sweeps through more jails and prisons, more defendants will decide to plead
guilty rather than risk exposure to the virus while incarcerated pretrial,
8
Anna Flagg, Jails Are Coronavirus Hotbeds. How Many People Should Be Released to
Slow The Spread?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 3, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features
/jails-are-coronavirus-hotbeds-how-many-people-should-be-released-to-slow-the-spread/
[https://perma.cc/ZQZ5-NYTA].
9
Carroll, supra note 5.
10
Id. at 72.
11
See Park & Meagher, supra note 2. Throughout the country, as of October 24, 2020,
152,955 people in prison have tested positive for COVID-19 and 1,276 people in prison have
died from the illness. Id. In addition, there have been 34,188 cases of coronavirus reported
among prison staff and 86 reported deaths. Id.
12
See id.
13
Kira Lerner, Amid One of the Nation’s Worst Coronavirus Outbreaks, a Shortage of
Ankle Monitors Kept Some People in Jail, THE APPEAL (June 2, 2020), https://theappeal.
org/chicago-cook-county-jail-coronavirus-ankle-monitors-shortag/ [https://perma.cc/48XB2U2J].
14
@RadleyBalko, TWITTER (Mar. 16, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://twitter.com/radleybalko
/status/1239657752001236992?s=20 [https://perma.cc/3H9T-V6AY]; Jolie McCullough &
Emma Platoff, Coronavirus Pauses Many Texas Court Proceedings. For Some, That Means
More Time in Jail, THE TEX. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2020, https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/
19/texas-courts-coronavirus-jury-trials-defense-attorneys/ [https://perma.cc/Y9WE-NZGU]
(citing a defense attorney who said that at least one local prosecutor “who tried to use fear of
catching the virus in jail to sway a defendant to take the offer already on the table”).
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regardless of their innocence 15 or their ability to launch a successful
challenge of their case.
These same fears affect those who are not incarcerated and awaiting
trial: rather than risk time incarcerated, these individuals may take a plea
since it could mean serving a home confinement sentence during the crisis, 16
or they may be willing to take a non-incarceratory sentence rather than
fighting the case and potentially ending up in a prison overrun by COVID19.
The coronavirus crisis highlights how seldom conditions of
confinement are brought up at sentencing and how unusual this is. 17 The
virus makes it impossible to ignore the reality of where we send people when
they are sentenced or held pretrial, because these forms of segregation now
come with risks of exposure to a potentially fatal illness. And because of the
pervasive nature of plea bargaining, these conditions—and the very real
likelihood of death by COVID-19—may become another bargaining chip in
the plea negotiation.
2. Waivers
Waivers are a common part of the plea process. When a defendant
pleads guilty, the defendant gives up rights typically associated with taking
a plea, like the right to proceed to trial. But the defendant often gives up
many additional rights, such as the right to appeal or the right to receive
Brady material. 18 These waivers showcase the power of the government to
set the terms of the plea agreement. And a prosecutor’s insertion of waivers
into a plea deal reminds us of the fact that plea bargains are contracts of
adhesion.

15

Edkins & Dervan, supra note 7.
There is some speculation that this is the reason Lori Loughlin, the actress awaiting trial
in the college admissions scandal, decided to plead guilty after months of holding out for trial.
She will be sentenced to two months in jail, and some speculate that she will be able to serve
the sentence at home rather than in a federal facility because of the coronavirus. Josh Barro &
Ken White, Should Joe Scarborough Sue President Trump, LRC PRESENTS: ALL THE
PRESIDENT’S LAWYERS PODCAST, at 30:51 (May 27, 2020), https://www.kcrw.com
/news/shows/lrc-presents-all-the-presidents-lawyers/should-joe-scarborough-sue-presidenttrump [https://perma.cc/WFK6-MB3J].
17
Levin, supra note 5.
18
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (finding the Constitution does not
require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96
MINN. L. REV. 952, 960–66 (2012) (discussing the use of plea waivers to bar defendants from
requesting future DNA testing).
16
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During this crisis, we are seeing ways in which prosecutors are requiring
defendants to waive specific rights related to COVID-19 in order to secure
the benefit of the plea. In Northern California, the U.S. Attorney requested
that some defendants waive any compassionate release requests for 180
days. 19 A district court judge ultimately struck down the waiver provision in
a powerful decision, 20 but the mere fact that the US attorneys attempted such
a waiver indicates the degree of latitude the parties have in negotiating pleas
and showcases the power of the prosecutor in setting the terms of a plea
bargain.
Still other prosecutors have been attempting to secure plea bargains via
letters sent directly to defendants. In one such letter in Maine, a local
prosecutor’s office offered–in light of the pandemic–to resolve a drunk
driving case via a form the defendant would fill out and return by mail. 21 The
offer included a sentence of 48 hours in jail and a fine, and although it noted
that the defendant could consult with an attorney, it did not require such
consultation. 22 Such a resolution would allow a defendant to give up the
constitutional right to counsel before accepting a jail sentence without any
appropriate waiver of that right. 23 Furthermore, the offer expired about a
month after the letter was sent and contained language that the defendant
could not “argue for [a] less” serious offer, 24 a move that could result in an
uncounseled defendant feeling pressured to accept the offer in the letter rather
than lose out on any deal in the future.
This sample of waivers demonstrates just how broadly prosecutors are
interpreting their power to impose waivers of constitutional and procedural
rights on defendants during the pandemic, making it nearly impossible for
defendants to appeal or alter their convictions or sentences if the plea was
coerced.

19

See generally United States v. Sembrano, No. 19-cr-00651-CRB-1, 2020 WL 3161003,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2020); see also Order Rejecting Plea Agreement, United States v.
Osorto, 445 F. Supp. 3d 103, 104–05 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2020) (No. 19-cr-00381-CRB-4).
20
Sembrano, 2020 WL 3161003 at *2 (“[T]he fact that the Government appropriately and
often successfully opposes compassionate release motions on the merits does not explain why
defendants should waive their right to bring such a motion at all. If the Government can oppose
– and courts can deny – motions for compassionate release on the merits, why is it also
necessary for defendants to waive or limit their right to move for compassionate release before
the merits of such a motion are knowable.”)
21
Letter to Todd Collins, Office of the District Attorney, Aroostook County, Re: New
Language in DA’s Office Plea Recommendation, June 26, 2020 (on file with author).
22
Id.
23
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
24
Letter to Todd Collins, supra note 21.
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B. THE DIFFICULTY OF HOLDING OR COMPLETE LACK OF JURY
TRIALS

1. No Jury Trials
Even before the crisis, we were living in a country with nearly no trials,
and the negative effects of a lack of trials are many: less development of the
law, fewer opportunities to develop a case’s factual record, fewer
opportunities for juries to review the decisions of prosecutors—the list goes
on. 25 Because of the public health crisis, in most jurisdictions there were no
jury trials during the spring and summer of 2020, 26 although some
jurisdictions did have limited jury trials–both live and online–during the
summer. 27 The fall of 2020 saw more courts attempting to hold trials with
mixed results. For instance, Maine’s first attempt to hold an in-person
criminal jury trial was scrapped after a witness’s child reported COVID-19
symptoms. 28 The status of the jury trial continues to evolve, but it is unlikely
things will go back to any version of normal for many months (even in the
very best scenario).
The lack of jury trials makes sense from a public health perspective.
Indeed, even the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys has
stated that holding criminal jury trials during the pandemic would be
“reckless and irresponsible,” and the “understandable fear, panic, and
25

Robert J. Conrad Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 157–61 (2018).
26
Coronavirus and the Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/
newsroom/public-health-emergency [https://perma.cc/WG4M-6SB3] (last visited Sept. 20,
2020) (showing statewide jury trial restrictions for each state and indicating that even as of
September 2020, many states were still postponing jury trials).
27
See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, A Jury Social Distanced Through an 8-Week Trial as
COVID-19 Raged. Here’s How They Did it, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 26, 2020),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2020/04/26/federal-jury-sits-through-8week-trial-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/3028236001/
[https://perma.cc/M5QC-XRTN]
(discussing Kentucky trials); Max Mitchell, Ohio’s First Post-COVID Jury Trial was Set to
Begin. Then the Defendant Nearly Collapsed, LAW.COM (Apr. 29, 2020, 6:48 PM),
https://www.law.com/2020/04/29/ohios-first-post-covid-jury-trial-was-set-to-begin-then-thedefendant-nearly-collapsed/?slreturn=20200509051618
[https://perma.cc/Y7E7-CZC4]
(discussing Ohio trials); Justin Jouvenal, Justice by Zoom: Frozen Video, a Cat – and Finally
a Verdict, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legalissues/justice-by-zoom-frozen-video-a-cat--and-finally-a-verdict/2020/08/12/3e073c56dbd3-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6RYE-CDJ8]
(discussing
Texas’s first online criminal trial).
28
Megan Gray, Maine’s First Mid-Pandemic Jury Trial Postponed Because of Possible
COVID-19 Exposure, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.pressherald.co
m/2020/09/15/court-postpones-first-mid-pandemic-jury-trial-because-of-possible-covid-19exposure/ [https://perma.cc/J2EP-FZA9].
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uncertainty” stemming from the pandemic would “undermine the truthseeking purpose of trials.” 29 As Melanie Wilson has noted, forcing jurors to
attend trials during a pandemic is an extension of the system’s often cruel
treatment of jurors and will serve to undermine the trial function since jurors
may likely rush to judgment to limit their potential exposure to COVID-19. 30
But other types of danger abound in an extended period without trials,
particularly for defendants who are sitting in jail awaiting trial. 31 While
many scholars have pushed back on the idea that plea bargains occur in the
“shadow of the trial,” 32 at least some plea bargaining happens with the idea
that a trial could occur. For instance, defendants who want to avoid
immigration consequences may opt for trial when no immigration-safe plea
bargain is on the table. 33 Or when the parties cannot reach a resolution on
the appropriate sentence, a defendant may wish to proceed to trial. And, of
course, innocent defendants may want a trial if the prosecutor refuses to drop
the case. However, with limited trials taking place and, as I explain below,
a hold on speedy trial clocks, plea bargaining is the only option for resolving
a case—a situation that only works for the prosecutor’s benefit. This is what
Thomas Maher recently called “plea bargaining in the shadow of COVID19.” 34
Additionally, as live jury trials resume, the health safety protocols
needed to reduce the spread of COVID-19 will make the trial so burdensome
that there will likely be fewer held. An August 2020 opinion by Judge Gary
R. Brown of the Eastern District of New York walked through the myriad

29

NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., CRIMINAL COURT REOPENING AND PUBLIC HEALTH
COVID-19 ERA 8 (June 2, 2020), https://nacdl.org/getattachment/56802001-1bb94edd-814d-c8d5c41346f3/criminal-court-reopening-and-public-health-in-the-covid-19era.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKA7-D5GW].
30
Wilson, supra note 5, at 1–2.
31
Although it is outside the scope of this essay, the canceling of grand juries during the
coronavirus raises other concerns about unfairness to defendants. Simone Weichselbaum,
Can’t Make Bail, Sit in Jail Even Longer Thanks to Coronavirus, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(May 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/can-t-make-bailsit-in-jail-even-longer-thanks-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/F53S-A72C].
32
The seminal article questioning the “shadow of trial” theory of plea bargaining is
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463
(2004).
33
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2017) (finding that defendants, even
when they are offered a favorable plea deal, may opt for trial where they face serious
immigration consequences).
34
Thomas Maher, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of COVID-19, DUKE L. CSJ BLOG (May
19, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/csj-blog/2020/05/19/plea-bargaining-in-the-shadow-ofcovid-19/ [https://perma.cc/GGU3-NYGW].
IN THE
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challenges of in-person criminal jury trials. 35 As Judge Brown noted, the
typical safety protocols—wearing face masks, social distancing, temperature
screenings, and the like—are probably insufficient to protect trial-goers since
most trials require hours of close contact among the participants. 36 Those
trials that do occur will be plagued with issues that decrease the chances of a
fair trial for the defendant. For instance, in addition to jurors needing to
maintain social distance, lawyers will likely have to remain socially distant
from one another and from their clients. This will make communication
between the defense attorney and client more difficult at trial, and it poses a
risk to the defendant’s ability to participate in her own defense. In addition,
smaller courtrooms may be unable to accommodate these arrangements,
leaving fewer courtrooms for trials to proceed. Trials will be at risk of being
cancelled at the last minute or mid-trial if any participants develop
symptoms. 37
The burdens of COVID-19 will also likely make it harder to select
jurors. Many jurors will opt out of service or fail to show up because of the
very real health risks of jury service, especially those from communities hit
hardest by the virus. 38 This means the jury pool will not only be smaller, but
likely less diverse. As Melanie Wilson argues, “[g]iven that the virus is
harming people of color in disproportionate numbers, and that white people,
Republicans and young people are least concerned about spreading and
contracting the virus, resuming jury trials during the pandemic may
exacerbate racial disparities in jury pools.” 39 Jury service will also be
unpleasant and anxiety-inducing, requiring people to wear masks for long
stretches of time. Other actors in the courtroom will also have to wear masks
and maintain social distance. Given these difficulties, judges and jurors will
be inclined to move trials along quickly, which rarely benefits defendants. 40
And it’s important to note that these are just some of the potential challenges

35
United States v. Cohn, No. 19-CR-097 GRB, 2020 WL 5050945, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2020).
36
Id. at 7–8
37
Gray, supra note 28.
38
For a discussion of how certain communities have been devastated by COVID-19, see
Maria Godoy, What Do Coronavirus Racial Disparities Look Like State by State?, NPR (May
30, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/30/865413079/whatdo-coronavirus-racial-disparities-look-like-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/7R9X-6D93].
39
Wilson, supra note 5, at 10–11.
40
Id. at 9–10.
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courts will face if they try to resume jury trials during the pandemic, which
is why jury trials are not picking up speed any time soon. 41
Because of these many challenges, some defendants are opting for
bench trials. Bench trials are not as difficult to carry out as jury trials for
many reasons: if they are done in-person, they involve fewer people, and if
they are done via video, they can be easier to coordinate. In this sense, they
pose a much smaller health risk to the parties involved while allowing
defendants to have their day in court. It is surprising then that in one
documented case out of the Eastern District of New York prosecutors
objected to the defendant’s mid-pandemic request for a bench trial, despite
the defendant’s health conditions that put him at greater risk of complications
from COVID-19. 42 Prosecutors instead insisted that the defendant continue
to drag out his case until jury trials resumed. 43 The judge ultimately granted
the defendant’s request for a bench trial. 44 But the implications for coercive
plea bargaining are clear here. The defendant had decided not to plead guilty
and to proceed to a bench trial. The government attempted to block that
request, which left the defendant to let his case linger while he waited for—
likely unsafe—jury trials to resume. Had the court not granted the
defendant’s request for a bench trial, the defendant would have had to plead
guilty or continue to wait for a jury trial he was terrified to attend because of
his health issues.
It is critical to note, though, that bench trials are not a constitutional
substitute for jury trials, which defendants are entitled to in cases that carry
a potential sentence of six months or more. 45 Although there is some
evidence that defendants have a greater chance of acquittal at a bench trials,46
there are many reasons that a defendant may opt for a jury trial. Even if some
defendants are willing to accept a bench trial, the right to a jury trial cannot
be abrogated by the pandemic. A lack of trials, particularly jury trials, will
41

Judiciary Issues Report on Restarting Jury Trials, U.S. CTS. (June 10, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/combined_jury_trial_post_covid_doc_6.10.20.p
df [https://perma.cc/4CVY-RSUV].
42
United States v. Cohn, No. 19-CR-097 GRB, 2020 WL 5050945, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2020).
43
Id. at *6.
44
Id. at *22.
45
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970).
46
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants go to Trial, and Most Who
do are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH CTR. (June 11, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-arefound-guilty [https://perma.cc/6QA8-7D6T]. In the federal court system in 2018, 38% of
defendants who went to a bench trial were acquitted compared to only 14% of those who opted
for a jury trial. Id.
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ultimately cement plea bargaining as the only means of resolving a criminal
case.
2. No Speedy Trial Clock
Another reason that the lack of trials is so concerning is because in many
jurisdictions once the pandemic began courts either formally or informally
stopped the speedy trial clock. Most states have adopted some speedy trial
statute, which requires the prosecutor to move forward with the case within
a specified period of time. 47 While many delays are not counted against the
speedy trial clock, 48 a delay should, in general, correspond with some
heightened chance that the speedy trial clock runs out and the case gets
dismissed. Furthermore, there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment. In Barker v. Wingo, the Court outlined the factors to
consider in determining post-hoc whether a defendant was denied a speedy
trial. 49 Those factors include the length of delay, the reasons the government
gives for delay on their end, whether the defendant asserted her rights, and
any prejudice to the defendant. 50 While the length of delay is the triggering
mechanism, the factors work as a balancing test and require a fact-specific,
post-hoc analysis of the case. 51 As such, a defendant does not enter a criminal
case with a clear understanding of what constitutes a constitutional speedy
trial, but the Court does indicate that factors entirely out of the control of the
state will weigh against the defendant in a speedy trial determination.
Defendants have not been able to rely on the speedy trial clock during
the coronavirus crisis as a statutory or constitutional matter, and if prior
disasters are any indicator, they will likely find that courts will be disinclined

47
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1) (Mckinney 2020) (stating a motion “must be
granted where the people are not ready for trial within: (a) six months of the commencement
of a criminal action is accused of . . . a felony; (b) ninety days of the commencement of a
criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of . . . a misdemeanor.”); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1382 (West 2010) (stating the court “shall order the action to be dismissed” if “[i]n a felony
case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant’s arraignment”
and “when a defendant in a misdemeanor or infraction case is not brought to trial within 30
days after he or she is arraigned . . . .”). But see State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.
1985) (stating that defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not protected by statute but will be
determined by the factors set forth in the Supreme Court case of Baker v. Wingo).
48
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(a)–(j) (Mckinney 2020) (providing a range
of reasons that certain time periods during the lifespan of a case are “excludable” from speedy
trial calculations, including among others, pretrial motion practice, proceedings regarding the
competency of the defendant, and pretrial discovery demands).
49
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 530.
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to start running the clock in the midst of the crisis. 52 First, since the beginning
of the crisis many state courts put the statutory speedy trial clock on hold. 53
In Massachusetts, for instance, the Supreme Court excluded all COVIDrelated delays until late October, including all delays related to pretrial
release. 54 This means that the clock was simply stopped, even for defendants
who were being jailed while awaiting trial.
Stopping the speedy trial clock significantly increases the prosecutor’s
leverage in plea negotiations. If a defendant objects to the terms of a waiver
or some other aspect of her plea agreement, the typical option—that is, to
proceed to trial—is not available. Second, on the back end, it is unlikely that
there will be any constitutional speedy trial remedy since COVID-related
delays are not the fault of the state. As such, the “reason for the delay” will
not be attributed to the government. 55 Although courts may change their tune
as the crisis progresses, these circumstances have likely already induced
many defendants to take pleas, knowing that no trial was in sight. As the
waiting game continues, there will undoubtedly be many more.
In many places it remains unclear as to when trials will resume, and
even if trials resume in some form in the next several months, there will likely
be a tremendous backlog of cases. As a result, defendants once again have
only two options: let the case linger or plead guilty.
C. ISSUES WITH ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Meaningful dialogue with counsel is necessary for a defendant to
voluntarily and knowingly waive her right to trial. A defendant is presumed
to understand the panoply of rights one waives at the time of the plea if she

52
Patrick Ellard, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the Right to a Speedy Trial to
Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1207, 1221–29 (2007).
53
In federal court, several district courts have temporarily stopped the speedy trial clock.
See, e.g., U.S. N.D.T.X., Special Order No. 13-11: Court Operations Under the Exigent
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (April 22, 2020), http://www.txnd.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SO13-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MSK-MHCV]
(“[T]he ends of justice served by ordering these continuances outweigh the best interests of
the public and each defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”).
54
Commonwealth v. Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 468 (Mass. 2020); see also Superior Court
Standing Order 9-20: Fourth Updated Protocol Governing Superior Court Operations During
the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, effective October 1, 2020, https://www.mass.gov/
superior-court-rules/superior-court-standing-order-9-20-fourth-updated-protocol-governingsuperior (noting that all jury trials are delayed until at least October 23, 2020 and that “trial
continuances order by SCJ are excluded from speedy-trial calculations”).
55
Although, as at least one commentator noted after Hurricane Katrina, a lack of
preparation for inevitable crisis should be held against the state in a speedy trial analysis.
Patrick Ellard, supra note 52, at 1233–35.
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consulted with competent counsel. 56 Defendants’ indispensable consultation
with counsel will be a challenge throughout the pandemic, because in-person
meetings between attorneys and their clients—which is, in many cases, the
ideal scenario for open dialogue—have halted. 57 “Out” clients can call from
home but many families are home together during the pandemic making it
difficult to have private conversations. In addition, the pandemic makes it
challenging to find spaces outside of the home that provide a private and safe
place to talk earnestly with a lawyer. This is also a real challenge for lawyers
working at home, who struggle to find private locations to have confidential
conversations.
For incarcerated clients, the challenges are even more profound. As
mentioned above, data shows that those incarcerated in jails and prisons are
at great risk of catching the virus. In addition, there is evidence that at least
some jails and prisons are responding to the risk of COVID-19 by making it
more difficult for defendants to speak with their attorneys. 58
But communication between lawyers and clients is not the sole
challenge during this crisis. Many essential defense attorney functions are
likely difficult or impossible to carry out. For instance, defense attorneys
have an obligation to investigate their clients’ cases, including before
accepting a plea. 59 But how does a defense attorney find hard-to-reach
witnesses during the pandemic? How does a defense attorney travel to the
scene of the crime when travel is restricted or poses a health danger? Some
attorneys may be willing to take the risk, but an attorney with a pre-existing
condition may understandably decide the risk is not worth it. How do
56
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (focusing on the critical role of
competent counsel in defendant’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily accept a guilty plea).
57
Chrissy Madjar, Kenneth Hardin, Eric Quandt, & Nathan Wade, 75 Percent of My Job
is In-Person, But I Can Barely See My Clients, MARSHALL PROJECT (April 17, 2020, 6:00
AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/17/how-do-i-defend-people-now [https://
perma.cc/NPV5-K6CZ].
58
Kim Kelly, At the Center of the Coronavirus Pandemic, People Inside NYC Jails
Describe Fear, Confusion and a Lack Of Supplies, THE APPEAL (April 8, 2020),
https://theappeal.org/new-york-city-jails-coronavirus-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/44T3WJXL] (discussing the challenges, including the lack of cleaning phones and public spaces,
that pretrial detainees face in communicating with the outside world). In addition, during the
recent Black Lives Matters protests, some prisons and jails shut down movement and
communication entirely. Lauren Gill, Federal Bureau of Prisons Locks Down Prisoners and
Takes Away Communications Amid Protests, THE APPEAL (June 3, 2020), https://theappeal
.org/federal-bureau-of-prisons-locks-down-prisoners-and-takes-away-communicationsamid-protests/ [https://perma.cc/MP6X-S5BG].
59
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTIONS § 4-4.1: DUTY TO
INVESTIGATE AND ENGAGE INVESTIGATORS (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/grou
ps/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/[https://perma.cc/9H4Q7YM7].
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attorneys share and discuss discovery with clients, both those that are
incarcerated pretrial and not? How do clients get access to the many other
people on a defense team, like paralegals, investigators and mitigation
specialists? All of this pretrial work also puts defendants in a much better
position for plea negotiations.
These issues are exacerbated by the fact that budgets are being slashed
for most public defender offices. 60 Evidence from the last recession indicates
that public defense is a low funding priority for states in crisis. 61 There are
also revenue-generating challenges specific to this crisis that will impact
defense work. For instance, in some places, funding for defense work is
generated through the collection of fines paid for traffic offenses. 62 With far
fewer people on the road, this revenue has dropped off a cliff, which will
likely produce a cascade of negative budget results. This same budget
challenge occurred after Hurricane Katrina as well, and states would be wise
to learn from the lessons of Katrina. Before Katrina, funding for the public
defender came largely from parking fines. 63 After the hurricane, that source
of revenue dried up and the number of public defenders in New Orleans
dropped from thirty-nine to eight. 64 It is clear that these economic issues,
along with the public health restrictions, create difficult and long-lasting
problems for a defendant’s right to counsel.
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Crisis can provide opportunity for change and reflection. One major
change since the pandemic began is that fewer people are being arrested in
many jurisdictions, particularly for low-level offenses. 65 In addition, there
have been more frequent grants of clemency and early release of those

60
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Public Defenders in this State are Told to Slash Budgets
as Traffic-Ticket Funding Plummets, ABA J. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/public-defenders-are-told-to-slash-budgets-as-traffic-ticket-fundingplummets [https://perma.cc/PEW4-J57Y].
61
Associated Press, Public Defender Offices are in Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 3, 2009, 8:59
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31093502/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/public-defende
r-offices-are-crisis/#.XuF3j55KhR0 [https://perma.cc/BBG8-CMVL].
62
See Cassens Weiss, supra note 60.
63
Ellard, supra note 53, at 1220.
64
Id.
65
Weihua Li, Police Arrested Fewer People During Coronavirus Shutdowns – Even
Fewer Were White, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 2, 2020) (noting that although arrests were
down, racial disparities in arrest rates worsened during the pandemic), https://www.themar
shallproject.org/2020/06/02/police-arrested-fewer-people-during-coronavirus-shutdownseven-fewer-were-white [https://perma.cc/JDB7-85TX].
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serving incarceratory sentences than the system normally experiences. 66 One
revelation that could emerge from the pandemic is an understanding that, as
a society, we do not need to arrest, detain, and incarcerate people at the rates
we currently do. The pandemic did not reveal the problems with mass
incarceration, but it may give us some empirical data to work with in the
future as we examine the scope of the system.
The backdrop to the solutions here should be an understanding that the
broad solution to the problems I address above are to dismiss many more
cases and, in those that are not dismissed, allow defendants to await
resolution at home without having to attend live court sessions. For the cases
that live on, I offer the following suggestions to lessen the risk of coercive
plea bargaining. Some of these I see as temporary fixes that should come
and go with the virus, but others may prove to be longer lasting. If
stakeholders can use this moment as an opportunity for creative problemsolving, there may be a silver lining to the chaos caused by the crisis.
A. VIRTUAL JURY TRIALS

The primary concern I identify above is the lack of jury trials. There
are some jurisdictions that have had jury trials during the pandemic by
seating jurors six feet apart and requiring everyone in the courtroom to wear
a mask. 67 This solution puts people at risk of becoming ill or dying from the
virus. 68 The courts ask citizens to pay too high a price in service of live trials.
I propose therefore that courts should experiment with trials over Zoom
or video conference, at least in misdemeanor cases. I realize this proposal is
fraught and practically challenging, but the response to the virus
demonstrated that whole areas of life can be switched over to Zoom or other
remote services with some planning. Indeed, lawyers are already thinking
about this possibility. 69 In Texas, at least one civil court has experimented
66
Associated Press, Illinois Governor Grants Commutations Amid Pandemic, TELEGRAPH
HERALD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.telegraphherald.com/coronavirus/article_0ce77ad88bd2-59cb-b62b-ee3df2fd8051.html [https://perma.cc/LF9D-22U8].
67
Shaila Dewan, Jurors, Plea Remove Your Masks: Courtrooms Confront the Pandemic,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/us/coronavirus-jury-trialoregon.html [https://perma.cc/Z9PY-EFVQ].
68
However, even when courts do have live trials, those trials must make public either the
transcript of the trial or a video recording of the trial in order to ensure the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial. Stephen E. Smith, The Right to a Public Trial in the Time
of COVID-19, 77 WASH. & LEE. REV. ONLINE 1, 11 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.
law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol77/iss1/1 [https://perma.cc/XW7V-JMMK].
69
Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus
Pandemic, ABA J. (May 11, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/could-zoomjury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/REZ6-SFXG].
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with a Zoom jury trial 70 and another court held a criminal trial in a traffic
case via videoconference, with jurors being provided iPads to follow the
proceedings on a dedicated YouTube channel. 71
There are many reasons why Zoom trials are problematic. As Jenia I.
Turner chronicles in her article, Remote Criminal Justice, lawyers and judges
report many issues with online proceedings, including problems monitoring
witnesses, glitches with technology that disrupt the proceedings and an
overall difficulty with presenting cases effectively. 72 Other scholars have
noted that Zoom trials erode the privacy of the participants. 73 Indeed, the
criminal trial in Texas was streamed via YouTube and was observed by
hundreds of people at any given moment. 74 In another trial streamed via
YouTube, a viewer at home called the court to report that a lawyer had failed
to redact the defendant’s full social security number in a document he screenshared. 75 Although trials are typically open to the public, the average
audience for a run-of-the-mill in-person trial would not have nearly the same
audience as one broadcast over the internet. In addition, virtual proceedings
may lead to bad outcomes for defendants. For instance, prior studies found
that defendants got worse results during virtual bail hearings than live bail
hearings. 76
Recent scholarship, however, pushes back against the idea that virtual
justice is necessarily inferior. As Susan Bandes and Neal Feigenson note,
70

Zoe Schiffer, A Court in Texas is Holding the First Jury Trial by Zoom, THE VERGE
(May 18, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/18/21262506/texas-court-jurytrial-zoom-remote-virtual-verdict [https://perma.cc/5JN4-ZANY] (noting that the verdict will
be non-binding as the court experiments with this format). According to the judge, it went
well. Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Is Anywhere Safe for a Jury Trial During the Covid-19
Pandemic? Try a School Gym., WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/isanywhere-safe-for-a-jury-trial-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-try-a-school-gym11589893201 [https://perma.cc/EK2B-H9XX].
71
Katie Hall, Travis County Traffic Case to be Trial Run for Video Chat Juries, THE
STATESMAN (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.statesman.com/news/20200806/travis-county-traffi
c-case-to-be-trial-run-for-video-chat-juries [https://perma.cc/3PAQ-8DQU]; Jouvenal, supra
note 27.
72
Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 21–27.
73
Sarah Esther Lageson, The Perils of ‘Zoom Justice,’ THE CRIME Report (Sept. 1, 2020)
(discussing Lageson’s book Digital Punishment, in which she reports on the harms to
defendants, witnesses and others whose testimony is broadcast via YouTube and other online
platforms).
74
The author watched parts of the trial on YouTube, where the tally of viewers was
observable. Id.
75
Id.
76
Shari Seidman Diamond, Locke E. Bowman, Manyee Wong, & Matthew M. Patton,
Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 891–98 (2010).
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our common law system is built on a tradition of live confrontation and, as
such, an assumption that in-person proceedings are best. 77 But virtual trials
offer opportunities to challenge those assumptions and perhaps even create a
more open system. 78 Matthew Bender goes further and argues that virtual
proceedings can be done fairly and in accordance to the constitution, 79 and
may even have a number of benefits, including expanding access to counsel
to underserved communities. 80
So, the jury is out—so to speak—about the advantages or disadvantages
of Zoom trials. Stakeholders will find that this moment provides a forced
experiment with new forms of technology that may or may not work for the
future. But my argument here is that offering zoom trials to defendants
expands the range of options available during this exceptional moment. To
avoid coercive pleas, defendants need options, particularly the option to
proceed to a jury trial.
But courts should also ramp up their ability to hold bench trials. Jury
trials are critical and should not be replaced, but bench trials are easier to
hold than jury trials and achieve many of the same ends. They resemble
hearings, which are being held via video conferencing software with success
around the country. 81 Therefore, although bench trials are not a perfect
substitute for jury trials, they have been shown to work during this crisis and
would provide defendants the opportunity to have their case heard. 82 To this
end, judges must commit to increasing the number of bench trials—a
sentiment echoed by the National Association of Defense Attorneys, which
takes it a step further and states that court systems should “afford the accused
the unilateral right to elect a bench trial where that right does not already
exist.” 83
From a procedural and constitutional standpoint, trials are the backbone
of the criminal justice system. Without trials, defendants are left with only
the plea offer on the table, which is an unfair position for them and an
untenable position for a system meant to provide an opportunity to air the
facts of a case. By removing trials, the public and adversarial nature of the
77

Bandes & Feigenson, supra note 5, at 3–4, 7.
Id. at 68–70.
79
Bender, supra note 5, at 40–46.
80
Id.
81
For instance, the actress Lori Loughlin recently had a plea hearing via Zoom. Kate
Taylor, Lori Loughlin Pleads Guilty via Zoom in College Admissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/us/lori-loughlin-pleads-guilty.html?search
ResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/2DJP-8CP6].
82
See Reynolds, supra note 69.
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NACDL, supra note 29, at 1.
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criminal justice system breaks down. It does not have to be this way:
proceedings over phone or video conferencing software can ensure that trials
continue and remain open to the public. Plea bargaining should not be the
only solution.
B. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN PLEA BARGAINING

Judges have an important role to play in ensuring the fairness of plea
bargains during this crisis, and there are several ways that this can happen.
First, judges should be vigilant in seeking out unsavory waivers. Judge
Breyer in the Northern District of California wrote a powerful opinion about
the injustice of asking defendants to waive their right to request
compassionate release, which should serve as a model for other judges who
confront these same waivers. 84 But more than that, judges should scour plea
agreements for novel waivers that relate to the COVID-19 crisis and
interrogate their purpose before accepting them. 85
Second, judges should be wary of all plea waivers during this crisis.
Defendants are under more pressure than normal to plea bargain, and waivers
of appeal and other rights should be excluded from these agreements. Judges
should encourage and push for the full exchange of discovery before any
pleas are taken. They should take additional care to develop a factual record
that reflects a crime and a voluntary and knowing plea on the part of the
defendant. These are the inherent requirements of a judge under any
circumstance, but the crisis asks us to confront the role of a judge in the rote
nature of the plea process. During the coronavirus crisis, judges must closely
supervise the plea process for signs of coercion, otherwise it will occur.
Unfortunately, early signs indicate that judges are not taking extra time to
assure that pleas are knowing and voluntary during this extraordinary time. 86
Third, although judges only have so much power over the terms of the
plea at the front-end, on the backend they can be more open to defendants’
claims of coercion during appeals and other post-conviction proceedings. A
plea must be taken voluntarily and free from coercion. Courts tend to cabin
the scope of voluntariness, 87 but the crisis should inform the legal conception
84
See United States v. Sembrano, No. 19-cr-00651-CRB-1, 2020 WL 3161003, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 28, 2020).
85
It is also worth noting that bar associations can play a role here by formally ruling that
certain waivers are unethical, thereby providing guidance to lawyers and judges.
86
Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 61 (finding that in observations of 59
plea hearings across eighteen different Texas courts, judges did not inquire into the factual
basis of the guilty plea 83% of the time and did not inquire into the voluntariness of the plea
39% of the time).
87
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978).
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of voluntariness. Is it voluntary to accept a plea when the alternative was
potential death in a prison or jail?
Finally, individual judges and court systems should count delays caused
by the pandemic toward any statutory or constitutional speedy trial clock.
Courts have allowed speedy trial delays during and after other disasters as
well, 88 but unlike a hurricane, which is a discrete event, we have no idea how
long this crisis will last. Without a vaccine, it is likely the problems
associated with the coronavirus will be with us for some time, making these
issues surrounding plea bargaining a prolonged problem, not a temporary
one. The burden of this crisis should not fall on defendants. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo explained that the Speedy Trial provision
of the Sixth Amendment was meant to serve three main interests: to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration, to reduce the anxiety associated with a
pending charge for the defendant, and to minimize the possibility that the
defense case would be impaired. 89 All of these interests are implicated
during the pandemic. Moreover, running the speedy trial clock during the
pandemic does not benefit defendants involved in serious cases, because in
many places the speedy trial clock does not apply to murder or similarly
serious charges. As a result, it is unlikely that defendants in serious cases
will receive a windfall from running the clock during the pandemic. Many
misdemeanors could be dismissed, but the alternative—to have these cases
drag on or result in mass plea bargains—is neither necessary for public safety
nor positive for the integrity of the system.
At the very least, courts should run the clock on the detention of those
incarcerated pretrial. In any case that is not resolved by a plea within a short
window, the defendant should be released, even if the case continues.
Releasing defendants pretrial is made all the more critical because of the high
rates of COVID-19 in jails. 90 But this should not be an opportunity to gouge
defendants on the fees of ankle monitors or other forms of home surveillance.
Again, the costs of our current disaster should flow to the state and not the
defendant.
There is a real risk that judges, faced with mounting dockets and no
clear end date to the crisis, will pressure defendants to plead guilty. Judges
should resist this temptation. The risks of coercive plea bargaining are
significantly heightened during the COVID-19 crisis. And the judge plays a
unique role in warding off false and unfair pleas.

88
89
90

Ellard, supra note 52, at 1221–29.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
See Park & Meagher, supra note 2.
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III. SILVER LININGS OF THE CRISIS
Progressive changes have occurred during the pandemic. Arrests are
lower in many jurisdictions. 91 Governors are granting clemency to
incarcerated individuals. 92 Many people are being released from jails and
prisons on compassionate release or for other reasons not related to the end
of their sentences. 93 So far, these changes have not produced an attendant
rise in crime. 94
On a broad level, the pandemic could expose some of the dysfunctions
of the criminal system while also mitigating others. As Benjamin Levin
explained in Criminal Law in Crisis, this “exceptional” moment “offer[s] an
important opportunity to recognize the cruelty, inhumanity, and
destructiveness that define U.S. criminal policy in ‘normal’ times.” 95 He
argues that the virus will force us to look more closely at the conditions of
jails and prisons, even when the country is not in the midst of a crisis.
Perhaps, too, the virus will force judges to think not just about the length of
the sentence but of the nature of the sentence.
Julia Simon-Kerr has also written about the potential benefits of having
witnesses wear masks during criminal trials in a system that demands
witnesses “perform” credibility. 96 If everyone is masked, it forces
participants to focus more on the oral testimony of the witness rather than on
their perceptions of the witness, which are often infused with bias. 97 Others
have written about how this moment might be an opportunity for progressive
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prosecutors to successfully push for reforms that shrink the criminal system
and the current rates of incarceration. 98
There may be benefits to the plea process itself during this time. Plea
bargaining has always happened in the shadows, and such shadowed plea
bargaining results in less data about the plea process. 99 In addition, during
appellate litigation, we are often left to rely on the word of the parties about
the nature of the promises made before the agreement was put into writing.
With lawyers not able to meet in courtroom hallways to discuss pleas, it
seems likely that more plea bargaining will occur by email and text, or by
Zoom or video, which may be recorded. Indeed, lawyers already report that
the plea process has slowed down as quick hallway discussions have been
eliminated in favor of other forms of communication. 100 This could have the
salutary effect of creating records of the plea process, giving us more data
both for individual appeals and for the study of the plea system.
In addition, recent work on negotiation and plea bargaining indicates
that although there are many drawbacks to negotiating over email or text,
there may be hidden benefits, especially for people who are bargaining from
a position of lesser power, 101 which is often the case for defense attorneys.
Email negotiation can “undermine existing power dynamics and encourage
direct confrontation because it stops one individual from seizing control of
the discussion and suppressing the view of another.” 102 By forcing a layer of
physical separation between the parties, the coronavirus could, in some
instances, benefit defendants in the negotiation process. But to be clear, as
described above, defendants generally operate from a position of weakness
in these negotiations, and this incremental dismantling of a power structure
is but small boon in an otherwise overwhelming system.
CONCLUSION
It has been a hundred years since we confronted a crisis like the one we
now face. And it is true that this crisis could exacerbate many of the problems
we see with plea bargaining—particularly its coercive nature—but there is
98
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also hope. Our response to this crisis may create space for new solutions.
By closely watching how stakeholders respond to this moment, we may see
opportunities to reshape much of the criminal justice system.
Stakeholders should be wary of falling back on plea bargaining as the
solution to the problems posed by the coronavirus. Coercive plea bargains
are a risk even when the system is running smoothly. For the reasons I
outline here, the risk of coercive pleas is heightened. Lawyers, judges and
court administrators have a responsibility to protect against the use of such
pleas.

